Articles From Other Sources
- 05 Sept 06
- International Crisis Group - Preliminary comments on the 5/9/06 ICG Report on Papua
- 19 June 06
- The Green Left Weekly - East Timor: The people are paying the price
- 06 June 06
- The New Zealand Herald - Ask the West Papuans what they want
- 04 May 2006
- The Press: Christchurch - Timor's list of infamy
- April 2006
- TAPOL Bulletin 182
Downloadable Articles/Newsletters
- March 2006
- West Papua Action Newsletter #17
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The ICG Report on Papua (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4364) dated 5th September 2006 provides a valuable insight into how the status quo will be defended in the months ahead. It begins by stating, "No part of Indonesia generates as much distorted reporting as Papua, the western half of New Guinea that has been home to an independence movement since the 1960s" (page 1). It's worth examining the ICG's own report for examples of such distorted reporting.
ICG Report: The Report dismisses "the idea that non-Papuan Indonesians are in control", asserting that it "is simply not true. The directly elected governors of Papua and West Irian Jaya, the two provinces within the broader territory of Papua, are indigenous Papuans, as are the heads of all 29 districts."(page 1).
Comment: A similar argument was made during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, whose governors were inevitably of East Timorese descent. Furthermore, the vote in East Timor for the ruling party Golkar had always been higher than the national average in previous elections. Nearly 80% of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia about two months after 80% of them participated in the post-Suharto elections of June 1999. Indonesian military heavyweight Feisal Tanjung would later claim that the high voter turnout was "a strong indication that the majority of the East Timorese were siding with Indonesia". He was mistaken. The ICG Report should similarly be treated with skepticism.
ICG Report: The ICG Report asserts that these Papuan leaders are not puppets of Jakarta (page 1).
Comment: The governor of West Irian Jaya is Abraham ('Bram') Atururi, a retired Marine Brigadier General. Atururi was a member of the National Intelligence Agency and he retains close connections to Indonesia's security apparatus. Doubtless, the central government hopes that he will increase the Indonesianisation of West Irian Jaya province.
ICG Report: The ICG Report claims that the Indonesian military "has over 12,000 troops in Papua, and there are between 2,000 and 2,500 police"(page 2).
Comment: The ICG has inserted the word "paramilitary" before "police" on 7th September. Note that the ICG has to establish its case; other people don't have to provide a rebuttal until the ICG shows how it came to its conclusion. The source of the ICG's claim (footnote 6, later amended to footnote 7) is listed as "Crisis Group interview, diplomatic source, June 2006". The ICG need not name its source, but should at a minimum shed light on the following:
1. Did the source provide evidence?
2. What was the nature of the evidence? Personnel records of TNI/other security personnel? Pay records? Something else?
3. Why did the source speak to the ICG?
4. Without wanting to expose the source:
a. what nationality was the source?
b. what is the general level of access that the source has?
c. did the source commit a security breach to reveal the material to the ICG?
d. if not, who cleared the source to brief the ICG?
Until such matters are addressed, it's hard to take the ICG's figures seriously. They seek to base a crucial claim (that Papua is not highly militarised) on an unverifiable assertion by an anonymous source.
ICG Report: The ICG Report claims that, although the province of West Irian Jaya was created illegally, "the Ministry of Home Affairs authorised elections for governor there, and a 70 per cent turnout last March gave legitimacy to a political fait accompli" (page 2).
Comment: As discussed above, nearly 80% of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia about two months after 80% of them participated in the post-Suharto elections of June 1999. Despite the ICG Report's assertion, no legitimacy should be assumed in Papua.
Furthermore, when the partition of Papua was announced, it met with strong opposition. A Special Autonomy Defence Team was established to challenge the partition in the Constitutional Court. The Team argued that both the Indonesian military and the National Intelligence Board (Badan Intelijen Negara, or BIN) had economic interests in maintaining a large military presence in the region. They pointed out that the establishment of the new province would benefit key figures in Megawati's political party, who had economic interests in the Bintuni Bay area where British Petroleum and Pertamina (Indonesia's state-owned oil corporation) are establishing the Tangguh liquefied natural gas plant.
The Special Autonomy Defence Team knew, for instance, that in March 2002 Papua's military commander, Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, had paid a visit to the Tangguh project together with other members of the security forces and their wives and girlfriends. According to witnesses, they had strolled around the project site brandishing automatic weapons. British Petroleum officials had hoped to ensure the project's security without involving the Indonesian military, but were soon disabused of that notion by Simbolon, who made clear that any deviation from the usual security role of the military for a project of national significance would need to be approved by Indonesian president Megawati.
The Special Autonomy Defence Team was supported by the then governor of Papua Dr Jaap Solossa and elements of the Papuan elite in Jayapura. Dr Solossa was an expert on the subject, having earned a masters degree in development economics from Gajah Mada University, and a doctorate with research on Special Autonomy from Padjadjaran University. He would later die under mysterious circumstances - a development that did not go unnoticed by Papuan critics of partition.
ICG Report: The ICG Report accuses "Solidarity groups" who "periodically raise the spectre of hard-line Muslim militias working with the army in Papua, which is predominantly Christian". It dismisses these groups, saying that "Little hard evidence exists. The salafi militia Laskar Jihad had a few hundred men in Sorong, in what is now West Irian Jaya, in 2001, but the organisation disbanded in October 2002, and there is little reason to believe it survived in Papua when it collapsed everywhere else.
Comment: Once again, the ICG Report omits the context. Something happened on 12 October 2002. It was known as the Bali Bombing, in which 202 people were killed and a further 209 people were injured. Little wonder, then, that Laskar Jihad's formal disbandment was announced the very next day. The Indonesian military was worried about the fallout from their support for this jihadist group.
Laskar Jihad began to enter Papua as part of an Indonesian military operation to terrorise Papuans. The group's Afghanistan-trained commander Jafar Umar Thalib established branch offices in several Papuan towns through the Sunni Communication Forum (Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunna Wal Jamaah, or FKAWJ), which had been formed in 1998. From the very beginning, there were strong indications that Laskar Jihad had the backing of military and political hardliners in Jakarta. Unlike other violent Islamic groups, which operated in a clandestine manner, Laskar Jihad revelled in shows of strength, such as rallies, demonstrations, parades, and processions. Its members also received military training near Bogor (West Java) and Yogyakarta from sympathetic members of the Indonesian military. Officer cadets, members of Kopassus, and martial-arts trainers were specifically involved in training camps near Bogor in April 2000.Members of Kopassus enjoyed the support of officers in the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) who were opposed to the reformist presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid.
Laskar Jihad displayed the extravagant rhetoric, quasimilitary forms, and Javanese-inspired symbolism usually adopted by the Indonesian military when it orchestrates a proxy war. They claimed religious sanction for their activities, and Maluku-based Christians, for example, were described as kafir harbi ('belligerent infidels')-the most dangerous category of non-Muslims. Four battalions were formed, each named after one of the Prophet Muhammad's first four successors: Batalyon Abu Bakr, Batalyon Umar bin Khattab, Batalyon Usman bin Afan, and Batalyon Ali bin Abu. Each battalion had four companies, each company had four platoons, and each platoon had three squads. In keeping with its quasi-military form, Laskar Jihad also had special forces, intelligence, and logistics units.
The group's explicitly nationalist agenda also conformed to the Indonesian military's strategy. Indeed, Jafar Umar Thalib went out of his way to emphasise his anti-separatist credentials, stating that the problem in Maluku was not caused by religion but by separatism. Thalib was arrested in Ambon on 4 May 2002 on charges of inciting violence. However, it is indicative of the high level of official acceptance accorded to Laskar Jihad at this time that he was visited in prison by then vice-president Hamzah Haz.
After Laskar Jihad was disbanded, the Indonesian military sent Eurico Guterres, the notorious militia figurehead from East Timor, to Timika in 2003 to establish the Front Pembela Merah Putih, or Red and White Defenders' Front (red and white are the colours of the Indonesian flag). Their presence increased the levels of tension among the locals.
Racism and silence
Missing from the ICG's Report is the issue of racism towards Papuans. If a European power were to act in Papua as the Indonesian military does, it would be called racist – and rightly so.
There are practically no Papuans visible on local television, which is awash with advertisements for skin whitening products such as Pond's White Beauty, L'Oréal White Magic, Bioré Body Whitening Scrub, Citra Skin Whitener, and so on. There have been attempts by some Papuan beauty salons to give a more indigenous feel to their operations, by emphasising 'black beauty', for instance. They have received intimidatory visits from local thugs as a consequence.
Reliable reports indicate that racial antagonism plays a role in the Indonesian military's presence in Papua. The most severe beatings in custody tend to be administered to Papuans who are darker than usual, or have a more prominent head, or are more muscular. On 14 July 2005, for example, soldiers reportedly tortured a Papuan by slashing his face and body with a knife and razor and then setting his hair alight after dousing it with petrol. A week later, 14 soldiers reportedly punched, kicked, and bit two Papuans, then placed a bundle of dried weeds on the back of one of them and set it alight.
Even sport is an indicator of separation between the Papuans and the other Indonesians. For example, although soccer is a popular sport in Indonesia, in Papua all the players are of Papuan descent, as are almost all the spectators; migrants to Papua show little interest in integrating with the locals. Nor is there a shortage of soccer balls: in many Papuan villages, a communal ball hangs in the net for people to use and replace afterwards.
For more details about Papua and related matters, see Reluctant Indonesians: Australia, Indonesia and the future of West Papua (Scribe, 2006):
http://www.scribepublications.com.au/book/reluctantindonesians
Preliminary comments on the 5th September 2006 ICG Report on Papua
Preliminary comments on the 5th September 2006 ICG Report on PapuaThe ICG Report on Papua (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4364) dated 5th September 2006 provides a valuable insight into how the status quo will be defended in the months ahead. It begins by stating, "No part of Indonesia generates as much distorted reporting as Papua, the western half of New Guinea that has been home to an independence movement since the 1960s" (page 1). It's worth examining the ICG's own report for examples of such distorted reporting.
ICG Report: The Report dismisses "the idea that non-Papuan Indonesians are in control", asserting that it "is simply not true. The directly elected governors of Papua and West Irian Jaya, the two provinces within the broader territory of Papua, are indigenous Papuans, as are the heads of all 29 districts."(page 1).
Comment: A similar argument was made during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, whose governors were inevitably of East Timorese descent. Furthermore, the vote in East Timor for the ruling party Golkar had always been higher than the national average in previous elections. Nearly 80% of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia about two months after 80% of them participated in the post-Suharto elections of June 1999. Indonesian military heavyweight Feisal Tanjung would later claim that the high voter turnout was "a strong indication that the majority of the East Timorese were siding with Indonesia". He was mistaken. The ICG Report should similarly be treated with skepticism.
ICG Report: The ICG Report asserts that these Papuan leaders are not puppets of Jakarta (page 1).
Comment: The governor of West Irian Jaya is Abraham ('Bram') Atururi, a retired Marine Brigadier General. Atururi was a member of the National Intelligence Agency and he retains close connections to Indonesia's security apparatus. Doubtless, the central government hopes that he will increase the Indonesianisation of West Irian Jaya province.
ICG Report: The ICG Report claims that the Indonesian military "has over 12,000 troops in Papua, and there are between 2,000 and 2,500 police"(page 2).
Comment: The ICG has inserted the word "paramilitary" before "police" on 7th September. Note that the ICG has to establish its case; other people don't have to provide a rebuttal until the ICG shows how it came to its conclusion. The source of the ICG's claim (footnote 6, later amended to footnote 7) is listed as "Crisis Group interview, diplomatic source, June 2006". The ICG need not name its source, but should at a minimum shed light on the following:
1. Did the source provide evidence?
2. What was the nature of the evidence? Personnel records of TNI/other security personnel? Pay records? Something else?
3. Why did the source speak to the ICG?
4. Without wanting to expose the source:
a. what nationality was the source?
b. what is the general level of access that the source has?
c. did the source commit a security breach to reveal the material to the ICG?
d. if not, who cleared the source to brief the ICG?
Until such matters are addressed, it's hard to take the ICG's figures seriously. They seek to base a crucial claim (that Papua is not highly militarised) on an unverifiable assertion by an anonymous source.
ICG Report: The ICG Report claims that, although the province of West Irian Jaya was created illegally, "the Ministry of Home Affairs authorised elections for governor there, and a 70 per cent turnout last March gave legitimacy to a political fait accompli" (page 2).
Comment: As discussed above, nearly 80% of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia about two months after 80% of them participated in the post-Suharto elections of June 1999. Despite the ICG Report's assertion, no legitimacy should be assumed in Papua.
Furthermore, when the partition of Papua was announced, it met with strong opposition. A Special Autonomy Defence Team was established to challenge the partition in the Constitutional Court. The Team argued that both the Indonesian military and the National Intelligence Board (Badan Intelijen Negara, or BIN) had economic interests in maintaining a large military presence in the region. They pointed out that the establishment of the new province would benefit key figures in Megawati's political party, who had economic interests in the Bintuni Bay area where British Petroleum and Pertamina (Indonesia's state-owned oil corporation) are establishing the Tangguh liquefied natural gas plant.
The Special Autonomy Defence Team knew, for instance, that in March 2002 Papua's military commander, Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, had paid a visit to the Tangguh project together with other members of the security forces and their wives and girlfriends. According to witnesses, they had strolled around the project site brandishing automatic weapons. British Petroleum officials had hoped to ensure the project's security without involving the Indonesian military, but were soon disabused of that notion by Simbolon, who made clear that any deviation from the usual security role of the military for a project of national significance would need to be approved by Indonesian president Megawati.
The Special Autonomy Defence Team was supported by the then governor of Papua Dr Jaap Solossa and elements of the Papuan elite in Jayapura. Dr Solossa was an expert on the subject, having earned a masters degree in development economics from Gajah Mada University, and a doctorate with research on Special Autonomy from Padjadjaran University. He would later die under mysterious circumstances - a development that did not go unnoticed by Papuan critics of partition.
ICG Report: The ICG Report accuses "Solidarity groups" who "periodically raise the spectre of hard-line Muslim militias working with the army in Papua, which is predominantly Christian". It dismisses these groups, saying that "Little hard evidence exists. The salafi militia Laskar Jihad had a few hundred men in Sorong, in what is now West Irian Jaya, in 2001, but the organisation disbanded in October 2002, and there is little reason to believe it survived in Papua when it collapsed everywhere else.
Comment: Once again, the ICG Report omits the context. Something happened on 12 October 2002. It was known as the Bali Bombing, in which 202 people were killed and a further 209 people were injured. Little wonder, then, that Laskar Jihad's formal disbandment was announced the very next day. The Indonesian military was worried about the fallout from their support for this jihadist group.
Laskar Jihad began to enter Papua as part of an Indonesian military operation to terrorise Papuans. The group's Afghanistan-trained commander Jafar Umar Thalib established branch offices in several Papuan towns through the Sunni Communication Forum (Forum Kommunikasi Ahlus Sunna Wal Jamaah, or FKAWJ), which had been formed in 1998. From the very beginning, there were strong indications that Laskar Jihad had the backing of military and political hardliners in Jakarta. Unlike other violent Islamic groups, which operated in a clandestine manner, Laskar Jihad revelled in shows of strength, such as rallies, demonstrations, parades, and processions. Its members also received military training near Bogor (West Java) and Yogyakarta from sympathetic members of the Indonesian military. Officer cadets, members of Kopassus, and martial-arts trainers were specifically involved in training camps near Bogor in April 2000.Members of Kopassus enjoyed the support of officers in the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) who were opposed to the reformist presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid.
Laskar Jihad displayed the extravagant rhetoric, quasimilitary forms, and Javanese-inspired symbolism usually adopted by the Indonesian military when it orchestrates a proxy war. They claimed religious sanction for their activities, and Maluku-based Christians, for example, were described as kafir harbi ('belligerent infidels')-the most dangerous category of non-Muslims. Four battalions were formed, each named after one of the Prophet Muhammad's first four successors: Batalyon Abu Bakr, Batalyon Umar bin Khattab, Batalyon Usman bin Afan, and Batalyon Ali bin Abu. Each battalion had four companies, each company had four platoons, and each platoon had three squads. In keeping with its quasi-military form, Laskar Jihad also had special forces, intelligence, and logistics units.
The group's explicitly nationalist agenda also conformed to the Indonesian military's strategy. Indeed, Jafar Umar Thalib went out of his way to emphasise his anti-separatist credentials, stating that the problem in Maluku was not caused by religion but by separatism. Thalib was arrested in Ambon on 4 May 2002 on charges of inciting violence. However, it is indicative of the high level of official acceptance accorded to Laskar Jihad at this time that he was visited in prison by then vice-president Hamzah Haz.
After Laskar Jihad was disbanded, the Indonesian military sent Eurico Guterres, the notorious militia figurehead from East Timor, to Timika in 2003 to establish the Front Pembela Merah Putih, or Red and White Defenders' Front (red and white are the colours of the Indonesian flag). Their presence increased the levels of tension among the locals.
Racism and silence
Missing from the ICG's Report is the issue of racism towards Papuans. If a European power were to act in Papua as the Indonesian military does, it would be called racist – and rightly so.
There are practically no Papuans visible on local television, which is awash with advertisements for skin whitening products such as Pond's White Beauty, L'Oréal White Magic, Bioré Body Whitening Scrub, Citra Skin Whitener, and so on. There have been attempts by some Papuan beauty salons to give a more indigenous feel to their operations, by emphasising 'black beauty', for instance. They have received intimidatory visits from local thugs as a consequence.
Reliable reports indicate that racial antagonism plays a role in the Indonesian military's presence in Papua. The most severe beatings in custody tend to be administered to Papuans who are darker than usual, or have a more prominent head, or are more muscular. On 14 July 2005, for example, soldiers reportedly tortured a Papuan by slashing his face and body with a knife and razor and then setting his hair alight after dousing it with petrol. A week later, 14 soldiers reportedly punched, kicked, and bit two Papuans, then placed a bundle of dried weeds on the back of one of them and set it alight.
Even sport is an indicator of separation between the Papuans and the other Indonesians. For example, although soccer is a popular sport in Indonesia, in Papua all the players are of Papuan descent, as are almost all the spectators; migrants to Papua show little interest in integrating with the locals. Nor is there a shortage of soccer balls: in many Papuan villages, a communal ball hangs in the net for people to use and replace afterwards.
For more details about Papua and related matters, see Reluctant Indonesians: Australia, Indonesia and the future of West Papua (Scribe, 2006):
http://www.scribepublications.com.au/book/reluctantindonesians
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This conflict need not have happened if all the country's politicians had put the interests of the people first and not their own desire for power. Their attitudes have resulted in hundreds of thousands of people losing their homes, other possessions or their livelihoods. Now they must live in tents provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
The conflict developed in the first instance around the issue of Loro Sae versus Loron Monu, or east versus west. Yet this ethnic issue has never been a serious problem in this country. During the last few weeks, it has grown so quickly, resulting in the breakdown of the good neighbourly relations that had existed here among East Timorese people of different ethnicity and religion. This is truly a tragedy! But it has happened.
In the current reality, we see so much irony, as is often the case as history and revolutions unfold. If we read some of the placards and banners that appeared during the recent demonstrations, we might laugh or we might get seriously stressed. For example, there were banners reading "Viva capitalism! Out with the communists!" So our question is; are Timor Leste's politicians that ignorant? Did the people who wrote those banners know what they really wanted?
We can answer here both yes and no. Yes, because those behind the demonstrations were indeed trying to paint former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri [who was pressured to resign on June 26] as a communist -- that there was a communist governing the country. And we can answer also "no" because the young people carrying those banners were from poor village and town families that have no familiarity at all with ideas such as capitalism versus communism. It is actually some very non-communist policies -- policies with no left character at all -- that have created this poorest class of young men and women.
For somebody to be accurately classified as a communist, his/her policies should show some similarity to communist ideas. Yet Alkatiri, and the Fretilin government he has led, have not the slightest communist colouring. The social system that has been fostered is one based on the existence of rich and poor classes. The Alkatiri government has implemented no policies aimed at ending this gap. Worse still, the Alkatiri government's policies have worsened the situation, with the phenomenon of cronyism exacerbating the rich-poor gap. It is a public secret that senior officials have tended to facilitate cronyism.
The economic policies of Alkatiri and Fretilin have tended to promote privatisation. There have been no indications that the Alkatiri government is interested in nationalising any private firms. There have been no signs of a left orientation towards land reform. The gap between rich and poor has grown. Agriculture has been abandoned so that the country as a whole is dominated by trade and by private traders. The peasant farmers have grown poorer under these capitalist policies. You can see the irony of them carrying banners stating "Viva capitalism! Down with communism!"
Public utilities such as electricity, telephone, land and air transportation are all controlled by foreign private firms. All the needs of the government are also supplied by private firms, not public companies or cooperatives.
Alkatiri and Fretilin have not organised the people in the way you would expect from a left-wing party. Fretilin has tended to turn itself into a party of the elite, which will mobilise the people from time to time to defend the party's interests, while ignoring the actual interests of the people. Fretilin under Alkatiri has divorced itself from the people and its leaders have adopted the lifestyle of the petty bourgeoisie.
In the cultural field, the Fretilin membership and its cabinet are religious in orientation. They show no signs of wanting to fight against the culture and religion of East Timor. The state radio and television gives more time to religious programming than to political education for the people.
The hostility towards Alkatiri flows from the struggle for power among the elite politicians. Several parties and their leaders are afraid of elections because they know that they cannot defeat Fretilin. At the last local elections, at the suco (village) and aldeia (sub-village) level, Fretilin won 80% of the positions. These results indicate that the country will remain dominated by Fretilin until the people's political consciousness develops further and they decide to support parties based on their political program and ideology and not based on the fictional history of a movement or party.
It was these political factors, supplemented by the interests of neighbouring countries vis-a-vis oil and gas, that the process developed to paint Alkatiri as a "communist". There was the hope that this could be used to mobilise the masses to defeat Alkatiri and Fretilin at the coming elections.
Another factor contributing to this situation has been Alkatiri's own leadership style. He takes a confrontational approach towards everybody and appears as arrogant.
What has happened in East Timor is not the case of a left-wing Alkatiri and Fretilin government being forced out of power by mass mobilisations. Alkatiri fell because he was disliked by some other elite politicians and because Fretilin was not able to bring forward another person capable of being a prime minister and of forming a new government. So some still hope that Fretilin can be destroyed at the next elections. That is what this is about: right-wing against right-wing.
After Alkatiri stepped down from his throne, speculation spread as to who might be his replacement. The newspaper Suara Timor Loro Sae reported that leaders of the various demonstrations started to promote Mario Carrascalao, a leader of the Social Democratic Party. They started to say that Jose Ramos Horta no longer had the support of the people. Why were they saying this?
Initially, it was stated [in a speech by President Xanana Gusmao] that the Fretilin leadership was not legitimate, because the Fretilin congress used a vote by show of hands and not a secret ballot to elect it. Yet negotiations went ahead with the Fretilin leadership and a compromise was reached. Out of this compromise, Horta emerged as the new prime minister. This was the result of a compromise among the political elite. The opposition politicians were outraged and again began to raise criticisms.
The policies outlined by Horta in his swearing-in speech indicate that there will be no substantial changes in policy. Working closely with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank has become a part of the reality here. The promises of building housing, of building an "academic town" and of distributing motorbikes to suco heads fosters false hopes. There are no signs of policies that can take the Timorese people out of their economic misery.
Alkatiri has fallen, but Horta's government is a Fretilin government. The president of Fretilin, Lu'olo, has made it clear that Horta must meet every week with the president and secretary-general of Fretilin and every month with Fretilin's national political commission. Horta has been steadily distancing himself from the opposition parties. Horta hopes to remain prime minister after the election by gaining Fretilin's support.
Who has won and who has been defeated? The people again are the losers.
[Avelino Coelho da Silva is the secretary-general and national political commissioner of the Socialist Party of Timor.]
GREEN LEFT WEEKLY - July 19, 2006
East Timor: The people are paying the price
Avelino Coelho da Silva, Dili -- The conflict that arose recently in Timor Leste has caused more suffering for the nation's poor people, confronting them with an uncertain economic and political future.This conflict need not have happened if all the country's politicians had put the interests of the people first and not their own desire for power. Their attitudes have resulted in hundreds of thousands of people losing their homes, other possessions or their livelihoods. Now they must live in tents provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
The conflict developed in the first instance around the issue of Loro Sae versus Loron Monu, or east versus west. Yet this ethnic issue has never been a serious problem in this country. During the last few weeks, it has grown so quickly, resulting in the breakdown of the good neighbourly relations that had existed here among East Timorese people of different ethnicity and religion. This is truly a tragedy! But it has happened.
In the current reality, we see so much irony, as is often the case as history and revolutions unfold. If we read some of the placards and banners that appeared during the recent demonstrations, we might laugh or we might get seriously stressed. For example, there were banners reading "Viva capitalism! Out with the communists!" So our question is; are Timor Leste's politicians that ignorant? Did the people who wrote those banners know what they really wanted?
We can answer here both yes and no. Yes, because those behind the demonstrations were indeed trying to paint former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri [who was pressured to resign on June 26] as a communist -- that there was a communist governing the country. And we can answer also "no" because the young people carrying those banners were from poor village and town families that have no familiarity at all with ideas such as capitalism versus communism. It is actually some very non-communist policies -- policies with no left character at all -- that have created this poorest class of young men and women.
For somebody to be accurately classified as a communist, his/her policies should show some similarity to communist ideas. Yet Alkatiri, and the Fretilin government he has led, have not the slightest communist colouring. The social system that has been fostered is one based on the existence of rich and poor classes. The Alkatiri government has implemented no policies aimed at ending this gap. Worse still, the Alkatiri government's policies have worsened the situation, with the phenomenon of cronyism exacerbating the rich-poor gap. It is a public secret that senior officials have tended to facilitate cronyism.
The economic policies of Alkatiri and Fretilin have tended to promote privatisation. There have been no indications that the Alkatiri government is interested in nationalising any private firms. There have been no signs of a left orientation towards land reform. The gap between rich and poor has grown. Agriculture has been abandoned so that the country as a whole is dominated by trade and by private traders. The peasant farmers have grown poorer under these capitalist policies. You can see the irony of them carrying banners stating "Viva capitalism! Down with communism!"
Public utilities such as electricity, telephone, land and air transportation are all controlled by foreign private firms. All the needs of the government are also supplied by private firms, not public companies or cooperatives.
Alkatiri and Fretilin have not organised the people in the way you would expect from a left-wing party. Fretilin has tended to turn itself into a party of the elite, which will mobilise the people from time to time to defend the party's interests, while ignoring the actual interests of the people. Fretilin under Alkatiri has divorced itself from the people and its leaders have adopted the lifestyle of the petty bourgeoisie.
In the cultural field, the Fretilin membership and its cabinet are religious in orientation. They show no signs of wanting to fight against the culture and religion of East Timor. The state radio and television gives more time to religious programming than to political education for the people.
The hostility towards Alkatiri flows from the struggle for power among the elite politicians. Several parties and their leaders are afraid of elections because they know that they cannot defeat Fretilin. At the last local elections, at the suco (village) and aldeia (sub-village) level, Fretilin won 80% of the positions. These results indicate that the country will remain dominated by Fretilin until the people's political consciousness develops further and they decide to support parties based on their political program and ideology and not based on the fictional history of a movement or party.
It was these political factors, supplemented by the interests of neighbouring countries vis-a-vis oil and gas, that the process developed to paint Alkatiri as a "communist". There was the hope that this could be used to mobilise the masses to defeat Alkatiri and Fretilin at the coming elections.
Another factor contributing to this situation has been Alkatiri's own leadership style. He takes a confrontational approach towards everybody and appears as arrogant.
What has happened in East Timor is not the case of a left-wing Alkatiri and Fretilin government being forced out of power by mass mobilisations. Alkatiri fell because he was disliked by some other elite politicians and because Fretilin was not able to bring forward another person capable of being a prime minister and of forming a new government. So some still hope that Fretilin can be destroyed at the next elections. That is what this is about: right-wing against right-wing.
After Alkatiri stepped down from his throne, speculation spread as to who might be his replacement. The newspaper Suara Timor Loro Sae reported that leaders of the various demonstrations started to promote Mario Carrascalao, a leader of the Social Democratic Party. They started to say that Jose Ramos Horta no longer had the support of the people. Why were they saying this?
Initially, it was stated [in a speech by President Xanana Gusmao] that the Fretilin leadership was not legitimate, because the Fretilin congress used a vote by show of hands and not a secret ballot to elect it. Yet negotiations went ahead with the Fretilin leadership and a compromise was reached. Out of this compromise, Horta emerged as the new prime minister. This was the result of a compromise among the political elite. The opposition politicians were outraged and again began to raise criticisms.
The policies outlined by Horta in his swearing-in speech indicate that there will be no substantial changes in policy. Working closely with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank has become a part of the reality here. The promises of building housing, of building an "academic town" and of distributing motorbikes to suco heads fosters false hopes. There are no signs of policies that can take the Timorese people out of their economic misery.
Alkatiri has fallen, but Horta's government is a Fretilin government. The president of Fretilin, Lu'olo, has made it clear that Horta must meet every week with the president and secretary-general of Fretilin and every month with Fretilin's national political commission. Horta has been steadily distancing himself from the opposition parties. Horta hopes to remain prime minister after the election by gaining Fretilin's support.
Who has won and who has been defeated? The people again are the losers.
[Avelino Coelho da Silva is the secretary-general and national political commissioner of the Socialist Party of Timor.]
Back to Top
(Activists who sought independence for East Timor never thought the transition to democracy would be easy)
Two Herald contributors, John Roughan and Michael Richardson have now gone into bat for the virtues of a unified Indonesia. I totally agree that New Zealand should foster positive links with Indonesia. If that means a boost in Government funds to the tertiary institutions so that they can get their Indonesian language courses going again I am all for it.
However, I strongly dispute the suggestion that good relations depend on uncritical acceptance of Indonesia?s rule in West Papua, or that the current crisis in Timor Leste shows that the country would have been better off if it had stayed under Indonesian occupation.
Let?s take things back a step. Through the long bloody years of Indonesia?s occupation of East Timor, our Government had scant concern for East Timorese aspirations. When I combed the declassified diplomatic records of those years it seemed to me that some of the officials couldn?t understand why the resistance continued.
Tim Groser, formerly our Ambassador to Jakarta and now a National MP, visited East Timor in 1995 and noted the strong support for independence but could not understand why people would not support ?the obvious compromise? of substantial autonomy.
Back then he seemed to share the concern Richardson has today about support for West Papua - that international activists were keeping the issue alive.
He noted: "After all, the poor position of the East Timorese is hardly worse than many other grossly unfortunate people in the world, but whose plight does not have an international character." [1]
Around that time desperate East Timorese activists began seeking asylum in foreign embassies including ours, but New Zealand incrased its defence cooperation and sent our Skyhawks to practice ground attack tactics with Indonesian planes.
Despite our government?s intransigence, East Timor?s resistance gained even stronger international support epitomised in a Nobel Peace Prize win for two of its leaders.
More importantly it won over significant numbers of concerned Indonesians, and ultimately important national political leaders.
Unlike John Roughan, I never thought that an impoverished and traumatised society would make an easy transition to independence.
There are roots of this year?s heart wrenching internal conflict that lie deep in the dark years of Indonesian military repression. Back then with spies on all sides, it was difficult to know friend from collaborator.
Timor Leste?s remarkable Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation did the best it could to heal the wounds with their meticulously detailed accounting for 24 years of human rights abuses. Community hearings gave victims the opportunity to tell their stories and for perpetrators to atone for more minor crimes.
But there has been no positive response to the Commission?s call for an accounting and compensation from the ?big fish?, the Indonesian generals and those nations who provided crucial support.
In the case of Australia, that country still benefits from the favorable oil and gas deal it stitched up with Indonesia during the occupation. Regrettably, impunity on this scale lays the ground for others to take the law into their own hands.
At the time of the Indonesian invasion Australian and New Zealand talked about the principle of self-determination, one of the clearest tenets in the United Nations Charter. But ?pragmatism? and Indonesia?s anti-communist credentials led them to kowtow to their powerful regional neighbour.
In the same vein John Roughan decries ?two bit? states. He is not alone. Australia is backing away as fast as it can from any perceived sympathy for the plight of West Papuans after having accepted the asylum claims of 42 West Papuan seafarers. Under international law Australia had little choice but to accept the group because their claims of persecution were watertight. Now none is likely to reach safe haven because Australia will work with Indonesia to mount a high-tech air and sea border surveillance using submarines, warships, planes and even satellites.
If any do make it through this cordon they will confront the ?Pacific solution? policy under which asylum seekers will be sent offshore to have their claims processed.
A key focus of West Papuan anger has been the Freeport McMoran mine whose gold and copper reserves rank among the largest in the world. The US owners derive fabulous wealth and the mine is Jakarta?s largest tax-payer.
Meanwhile, the local people live in poverty and many millions of tons of waste are dumped each year into their once pristine rivers.
Would Roughan and Richardson take their arguments to the point of arguing for a new age of Empires? If not then we should give the seductive arguments against ?separatism? a more critical look, and more importantly ask the West Papuans what they want. Back in 1961 the Dutch colonial power planned for the decolonisation of West Papua, but Indonesia persuaded its western friends to back its claim to control the mineral rich territory. The UN to its shame also colluded with Indonesia and decided not to challenge a patently sham 1969 referendum in which only 1,022 press ganged men took part.
Even so, West Papuans are not currently calling for a new vote. Rather, over the past four years there has been a strong call coming from the churches and the traditional councils for West Papua to be declared a ?Land of Peace?. This vision is about restoring human rights, dignity and basic fairness and the pre-requisite is a broad based dialogue with Jakarta and substantial demilitarisation.
Aceh will soon have a new law which sets the parameters for the province to have internal self-government. If that process continues to go well it will set a valuable precedent and there is bound to be considerable national and international pressure for a similar plan for West Papua. No doubt that will not suit the military, but there are indications that some political figures, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, are open to peace proposals.
Maire Leadbeater
Spokesperson
Indonesia Human Rights Committee
The NZ Herald WEDNESDAY 07 JUNE 2006
Ask the West Papuans what they want
by Maire Leadbeater(Activists who sought independence for East Timor never thought the transition to democracy would be easy)
Two Herald contributors, John Roughan and Michael Richardson have now gone into bat for the virtues of a unified Indonesia. I totally agree that New Zealand should foster positive links with Indonesia. If that means a boost in Government funds to the tertiary institutions so that they can get their Indonesian language courses going again I am all for it.
However, I strongly dispute the suggestion that good relations depend on uncritical acceptance of Indonesia?s rule in West Papua, or that the current crisis in Timor Leste shows that the country would have been better off if it had stayed under Indonesian occupation.
Let?s take things back a step. Through the long bloody years of Indonesia?s occupation of East Timor, our Government had scant concern for East Timorese aspirations. When I combed the declassified diplomatic records of those years it seemed to me that some of the officials couldn?t understand why the resistance continued.
Tim Groser, formerly our Ambassador to Jakarta and now a National MP, visited East Timor in 1995 and noted the strong support for independence but could not understand why people would not support ?the obvious compromise? of substantial autonomy.
Back then he seemed to share the concern Richardson has today about support for West Papua - that international activists were keeping the issue alive.
He noted: "After all, the poor position of the East Timorese is hardly worse than many other grossly unfortunate people in the world, but whose plight does not have an international character." [1]
Around that time desperate East Timorese activists began seeking asylum in foreign embassies including ours, but New Zealand incrased its defence cooperation and sent our Skyhawks to practice ground attack tactics with Indonesian planes.
Despite our government?s intransigence, East Timor?s resistance gained even stronger international support epitomised in a Nobel Peace Prize win for two of its leaders.
More importantly it won over significant numbers of concerned Indonesians, and ultimately important national political leaders.
Unlike John Roughan, I never thought that an impoverished and traumatised society would make an easy transition to independence.
There are roots of this year?s heart wrenching internal conflict that lie deep in the dark years of Indonesian military repression. Back then with spies on all sides, it was difficult to know friend from collaborator.
Timor Leste?s remarkable Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation did the best it could to heal the wounds with their meticulously detailed accounting for 24 years of human rights abuses. Community hearings gave victims the opportunity to tell their stories and for perpetrators to atone for more minor crimes.
But there has been no positive response to the Commission?s call for an accounting and compensation from the ?big fish?, the Indonesian generals and those nations who provided crucial support.
In the case of Australia, that country still benefits from the favorable oil and gas deal it stitched up with Indonesia during the occupation. Regrettably, impunity on this scale lays the ground for others to take the law into their own hands.
At the time of the Indonesian invasion Australian and New Zealand talked about the principle of self-determination, one of the clearest tenets in the United Nations Charter. But ?pragmatism? and Indonesia?s anti-communist credentials led them to kowtow to their powerful regional neighbour.
In the same vein John Roughan decries ?two bit? states. He is not alone. Australia is backing away as fast as it can from any perceived sympathy for the plight of West Papuans after having accepted the asylum claims of 42 West Papuan seafarers. Under international law Australia had little choice but to accept the group because their claims of persecution were watertight. Now none is likely to reach safe haven because Australia will work with Indonesia to mount a high-tech air and sea border surveillance using submarines, warships, planes and even satellites.
If any do make it through this cordon they will confront the ?Pacific solution? policy under which asylum seekers will be sent offshore to have their claims processed.
A key focus of West Papuan anger has been the Freeport McMoran mine whose gold and copper reserves rank among the largest in the world. The US owners derive fabulous wealth and the mine is Jakarta?s largest tax-payer.
Meanwhile, the local people live in poverty and many millions of tons of waste are dumped each year into their once pristine rivers.
Would Roughan and Richardson take their arguments to the point of arguing for a new age of Empires? If not then we should give the seductive arguments against ?separatism? a more critical look, and more importantly ask the West Papuans what they want. Back in 1961 the Dutch colonial power planned for the decolonisation of West Papua, but Indonesia persuaded its western friends to back its claim to control the mineral rich territory. The UN to its shame also colluded with Indonesia and decided not to challenge a patently sham 1969 referendum in which only 1,022 press ganged men took part.
Even so, West Papuans are not currently calling for a new vote. Rather, over the past four years there has been a strong call coming from the churches and the traditional councils for West Papua to be declared a ?Land of Peace?. This vision is about restoring human rights, dignity and basic fairness and the pre-requisite is a broad based dialogue with Jakarta and substantial demilitarisation.
Aceh will soon have a new law which sets the parameters for the province to have internal self-government. If that process continues to go well it will set a valuable precedent and there is bound to be considerable national and international pressure for a similar plan for West Papua. No doubt that will not suit the military, but there are indications that some political figures, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, are open to peace proposals.
Maire Leadbeater
Spokesperson
Indonesia Human Rights Committee
Back to Top
Tension is running high in Timor Leste (the former East Timor) following the March dismissal of nearly 600 soldiers, one third of that country's defence force.
The military men had earlier left their barracks after a long dispute with their commanders about alleged discrimination and intrusive surveillance. The men, mostly former resistance fighters, came out on the streets with more than 4000 supporters to protest their sacking and to call for the president to help find a solution to their grievances. The latest reports are of violent clashes between police and demonstrators which resulted in at least two people being killed and many being hospitalised.
For 24 years, a small ill-equipped guerrilla army stood firm against an Indonesian military force that was superior in every way except popular support and commitment. It is easy to imagine that these brave men would be facing a difficult transition to regular barracks life.
But the problem undoubtedly goes much deeper. Poor social conditions are the lot of all East Timorese; statistically they are worse off than all other South-east Asian peoples. Average life expectancy is only 55.5 years. The country is dependent on foreign aid from the major powers, including Australia.
So it is understandable that the parliamentary leadership has been focused on developing good relationships with its large neighbours Australia and Indonesia. But ordinary Timorese cannot be expected to just turn the page on their recent past.
One light in the darkness is the extraordinary report of Timor Leste's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. The UN-sanctioned report sets a new benchmark for the process of truth seeking, considered a rite of passage for societies making the transition from repression to democracy. But sadly, East Timor's leaders first delayed its release and then downplayed its unequivocal recommendations.
Unlike previous East Timor human rights probes, which have been restricted to the cataclysmic violence of 1999, this is the first justice process to consider the suffering of the East Timorese people over the 25 year period of the Indonesian occupation.
The betrayal of East Timor was very much an international project and the report confronts the issue of culpability head on. Yes, key generals are named and shamed, but the more important emphasis is accorded to states and institutions. Unsurprisingly, that means that there is a searing exposure of the role of the Indonesian state, its army and key intelligence institutions. But it has also meant dealing with the culpability of the major Western nations who backed Indonesia diplomatically, militarily and economically.
New Zealand is on the list of infamy for its strong diplomatic support for Indonesia, a bipartisan policy under Labour and National administrations. The United States, Australia, Britain and Japan may have played more prominent roles, but from the start Indonesia found New Zealand very willing to help legitimise its takeover.
The United States, Australia, Britain and Japan may have played more prominent roles, but from the start Indonesia found New Zealand very willing to help legitimise its takeover.
The report refers to several shameful instances when New Zealand diplomats and politicians went to bat for Indonesia. New Zealand Ambassador Roger Peren was one of the first diplomats to be invited to visit East Timor back in 1978. He reported back that the people could be too "simple" and "primitive" to "perform as responsible citizens of an independent country". Even as late as 1995 Foreign Minister Don McKinnon "questioned calling Indonesia's annexation an `invasion', and stated that Indonesia intervened because of a `huge refugee problem' and to `support the weaker side' in bloody civil war".
Meanwhile "massive, widespread and systematic" human rights violations took place, including the use of civilians as human shields in military operations, forced displacement, napalm bombing campaigns, rape, sexual slavery, torture, deliberate use of starvation and cold-blooded massacres. Western nations, particularly the United States, Britain and France, helped Indonesia out when weapons and ammunition ran low.
The commission calls on all states that had military relationships with Indonesia, "whether or not this assistance was used directly in East Timor", to contribute to a reparations programme to help alleviate the ongoing suffering of surviving victims. New Zealand should cough up because our defence force trained Indonesian military personnel every year from 1973 to 1999. Officers came here to learn many skills, including small-arms shooting and how to improve their counter-insurgency skills.
New Zealand is also urged to help get to the truth of the pivotal event two months before the invasion when six Australian-based journalists, including a New Zealander, were killed close to East Timor's border with Indonesia. The six were about to reveal details of Indonesian military infiltration. From the start, Western governments closed ranks and kept secret what they knew about the circumstances of the murders. The New Zealand government has never apologised to the family of Kiwi cameraman Gary Cunningham for failing to take any action to seek out the truth about his death.
Using a range of tools, including a graveyard survey, the commission estimates that up to 183,000 people lost their lives during 24 years of conflict. Undaunted by the scale of this tragedy the commission faithfully restored dignity to as many victims as possible by identifying them and the circumstances in which they were killed, starved or abused. In the process they collected moving testimony from nearly 8000 people and viewed a mountain of foreign official documents, including four volumes of declassified documents from New Zealand.
The commissioners showed no fear or favour, the Fretilin resistance is not spared its share of responsibility for civilian deaths, including the execution of political opponents.
The commission was not set up as a court of law, so for now impunity reigns. But the East Timorese cannot wait much longer for the world to make amends. New Zealand should challenge the UN to heed the report's recommendations and set the ball rolling by declaring that it will be the first to pay reparations. The apt Portuguese title of the Timor Leste Commission Report is "Chega!" or in English "Enough!"
* Maire Leadbeater is the spokeswoman for the Indonesia Human Rights Committee.
The Press: Christchurch, THURSDAY, 04 MAY 2006
Timor's list of infamy
Continued troubles in the fledgling state of Timor Leste are the legacy of the country's historical betrayal, writes MAIRE LEADBEATER.Tension is running high in Timor Leste (the former East Timor) following the March dismissal of nearly 600 soldiers, one third of that country's defence force.
The military men had earlier left their barracks after a long dispute with their commanders about alleged discrimination and intrusive surveillance. The men, mostly former resistance fighters, came out on the streets with more than 4000 supporters to protest their sacking and to call for the president to help find a solution to their grievances. The latest reports are of violent clashes between police and demonstrators which resulted in at least two people being killed and many being hospitalised.
For 24 years, a small ill-equipped guerrilla army stood firm against an Indonesian military force that was superior in every way except popular support and commitment. It is easy to imagine that these brave men would be facing a difficult transition to regular barracks life.
But the problem undoubtedly goes much deeper. Poor social conditions are the lot of all East Timorese; statistically they are worse off than all other South-east Asian peoples. Average life expectancy is only 55.5 years. The country is dependent on foreign aid from the major powers, including Australia.
So it is understandable that the parliamentary leadership has been focused on developing good relationships with its large neighbours Australia and Indonesia. But ordinary Timorese cannot be expected to just turn the page on their recent past.
One light in the darkness is the extraordinary report of Timor Leste's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. The UN-sanctioned report sets a new benchmark for the process of truth seeking, considered a rite of passage for societies making the transition from repression to democracy. But sadly, East Timor's leaders first delayed its release and then downplayed its unequivocal recommendations.
Unlike previous East Timor human rights probes, which have been restricted to the cataclysmic violence of 1999, this is the first justice process to consider the suffering of the East Timorese people over the 25 year period of the Indonesian occupation.
The betrayal of East Timor was very much an international project and the report confronts the issue of culpability head on. Yes, key generals are named and shamed, but the more important emphasis is accorded to states and institutions. Unsurprisingly, that means that there is a searing exposure of the role of the Indonesian state, its army and key intelligence institutions. But it has also meant dealing with the culpability of the major Western nations who backed Indonesia diplomatically, militarily and economically.
New Zealand is on the list of infamy for its strong diplomatic support for Indonesia, a bipartisan policy under Labour and National administrations. The United States, Australia, Britain and Japan may have played more prominent roles, but from the start Indonesia found New Zealand very willing to help legitimise its takeover.
The United States, Australia, Britain and Japan may have played more prominent roles, but from the start Indonesia found New Zealand very willing to help legitimise its takeover.
The report refers to several shameful instances when New Zealand diplomats and politicians went to bat for Indonesia. New Zealand Ambassador Roger Peren was one of the first diplomats to be invited to visit East Timor back in 1978. He reported back that the people could be too "simple" and "primitive" to "perform as responsible citizens of an independent country". Even as late as 1995 Foreign Minister Don McKinnon "questioned calling Indonesia's annexation an `invasion', and stated that Indonesia intervened because of a `huge refugee problem' and to `support the weaker side' in bloody civil war".
Meanwhile "massive, widespread and systematic" human rights violations took place, including the use of civilians as human shields in military operations, forced displacement, napalm bombing campaigns, rape, sexual slavery, torture, deliberate use of starvation and cold-blooded massacres. Western nations, particularly the United States, Britain and France, helped Indonesia out when weapons and ammunition ran low.
The commission calls on all states that had military relationships with Indonesia, "whether or not this assistance was used directly in East Timor", to contribute to a reparations programme to help alleviate the ongoing suffering of surviving victims. New Zealand should cough up because our defence force trained Indonesian military personnel every year from 1973 to 1999. Officers came here to learn many skills, including small-arms shooting and how to improve their counter-insurgency skills.
New Zealand is also urged to help get to the truth of the pivotal event two months before the invasion when six Australian-based journalists, including a New Zealander, were killed close to East Timor's border with Indonesia. The six were about to reveal details of Indonesian military infiltration. From the start, Western governments closed ranks and kept secret what they knew about the circumstances of the murders. The New Zealand government has never apologised to the family of Kiwi cameraman Gary Cunningham for failing to take any action to seek out the truth about his death.
Using a range of tools, including a graveyard survey, the commission estimates that up to 183,000 people lost their lives during 24 years of conflict. Undaunted by the scale of this tragedy the commission faithfully restored dignity to as many victims as possible by identifying them and the circumstances in which they were killed, starved or abused. In the process they collected moving testimony from nearly 8000 people and viewed a mountain of foreign official documents, including four volumes of declassified documents from New Zealand.
The commissioners showed no fear or favour, the Fretilin resistance is not spared its share of responsibility for civilian deaths, including the execution of political opponents.
The commission was not set up as a court of law, so for now impunity reigns. But the East Timorese cannot wait much longer for the world to make amends. New Zealand should challenge the UN to heed the report's recommendations and set the ball rolling by declaring that it will be the first to pay reparations. The apt Portuguese title of the Timor Leste Commission Report is "Chega!" or in English "Enough!"
* Maire Leadbeater is the spokeswoman for the Indonesia Human Rights Committee.
Back to Top
TAPOL Bulletin 182, April 2006
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*YL) oԵ*7ʍ8&$kcJD{QtJSe6FX/dPJ'G.RAb@a& the confidence to defy the old prevailing structures. The military structure was and arguably still is the best organised institutional and political force. More often than not, if candidates are being nominated for governor or district chief, the military candidate will be selected and elected, not least because he previously served as military commander while civilian candidates are seen as inexperienced.
As we have already seen, achieving military professionalism is a long and winding road. It was not all that long ago that a civilian was appointed as minister of defence and efforts to place the TNI headquarters fully under his department are still in the making. The long and the short of it is that TNI reform will take time but having a government with a strong political will can hasten this process.
The experience of the Megawati years is clear; they were wasted years. The present team - SBY and Yusuf Kalla - have started very well with the withdrawal (without any significant problems) of the TNI from Aceh. The government should be encouraged to continue along this line, including by overseeing the demilitarisation of West Papua.
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: http://tapol.gn.apc.org
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia,
1973-2004
TAPOL Bulletin 182, April 2006
Civil supremacy and reform of the military
One of the most important features of the post-Suharto era is the long and difficult process of reforming the military (TNI). Ever since the birth of the IndonesianLhX>F ;@nH]ꃥ-@k+{ cltS ?kedLn _,ڟTx\R*rJVTB|XS []TN?ܪ-C1R, f`dD(Isk UF-V kWe ),"n%r 6g K~I2As we have already seen, achieving military professionalism is a long and winding road. It was not all that long ago that a civilian was appointed as minister of defence and efforts to place the TNI headquarters fully under his department are still in the making. The long and the short of it is that TNI reform will take time but having a government with a strong political will can hasten this process.
The experience of the Megawati years is clear; they were wasted years. The present team - SBY and Yusuf Kalla - have started very well with the withdrawal (without any significant problems) of the TNI from Aceh. The government should be encouraged to continue along this line, including by overseeing the demilitarisation of West Papua.
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: http://tapol.gn.apc.org
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia,
1973-2004
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WPA Newsletter #17 (March 2006)
Contents/Headlines:
- Background on West Papua
- Arrival of West Papuan Asylum Seekers tests relations between Australian government and Indonesia
- Papuan rebel commander arrested over mine ambush
- Filep Karma and Yusak Pakage jailed for raising flag
- Senior Police Officers acquitted over Abepura killings
- Ten thousand Papuans criticize special autonomy implementation
- Susilo warns U.S. not to interfere in Papua
- The hellish truth behind Papua's paradise
- Articles from the Toronto Star and NY Times
- Campaign Updates (Ireland)
Download (150kB) in PDF format - needs Adobe Reader or similar to open.